Tension knots and stuck riser in reserve.

Order of events from memory. Stable flat belly-to-earth deployment at around 5000-5500 feet.  Remained this way for at least six seconds including a right head turn. Nothing felt so went to emergency procedures, cutaway, and reserve deployment.  Was spun in the air onto my back and was looking up at the leg and watching lines of a parachute unravel from around a leg/foot. The next moment a reserve parachute opened above my head in a very hard spin and the riser up, could not be corrected with toggles. Initially assumed this was the reserve parachute catching my leg but logically more likely was the primary chute.  Memory is fallible. Very hard landing. Would the tension knots have been caused by unstable deployment when I was turned onto my back? 

Only about 63 jumps and the first cutaway.  Respectful honest feedback is appreciated.  

More information would be helpful if you can provide it. Any feedback you get here will be speculative because there are many unknowns and possibilities. To me the first and most obvious piece of information missing is what was the state of the main canopy and it's deployment system both at landing and during the descent under the malfunctioning reserve?

Yeah it is a little hard to piece together what was happening based on imperfect memories after what sounds like a crash landing.

A possible scenario:

Pilot chute in tow. (Rather than pilot chute around leg, which wouldn't have left you still falling stably while 'nothing happened' for some seconds.)  Cutaway & reserve procedures performed. Loss of pressure on main container allows main to come out of container as reserve deploys. Bad luck and bad timing results in a riser from the main tangling in the deploying reserve.

Probably nothing to do with tension knots.

Just an effectively fucked-up reserve because there's a main parachute somehow connected to it by a main riser caught up in it, pulling at it probably off center or maybe partially choking it off.

Leading to a high speed impact under a spiralling, perhaps partially inflated reserve. There are certainly some youtube videos out there of such scenarios.

Various related possibilities don't change the basic scenario, just how bad it might be: You might have been thrown into line twists under the reserve; the main could have been partially inflated, mostly streamered, or still caught up in its bag by its lines; the reserve canopy could be fully inflated or have part of it pulled together if the main riser wrapped itself around or through multiple lines or caught under rather than over the slider.

Question, was the main still in the container or if not, was it fully deployed or still in the d-bag?

Thank you for the replies.

 gowlerk; I was using hired gear and would have been having a helicopter ride to the city hospital but  I have been informed that the primary parachute was a tangled mess when retrieved and therefore nothing could be learnt from its state. There was no comment about the pilot chute so I assume it looked normal.  The reserve parachute had been moved to create shade during my treatment from emergency services so this disrupted its state but I have a photograph from the air before it was disturbed, I have included it. The parachutes were sent to the manufacturers for examination and came back clear and lines looked undamaged but here were line marks on the one leg of my jump suit.

Pchapman; it was a crash landing, 30 broken bones all up but fortunately central nervous system intact other than tingling tips of little and ring finger corresponding to cervical vertebrae. (A little reminder of how bad it may have been :). Hopefully the photograph will be useful, not thought of a riser of the main fouling the reserve and choking it off.

Ufk22; main had been deployed and not in bag but a tangled mess when retrieved. I think we do tend to constantly ruminate over the event, partly to make the sport safer and partly to relive ourselves of recrimination.

Tension knots can happen any time and it sounds like (given inspections) you may have had a bad one.  You don't say how much the reserve was loaded ,  which would be a factor.

We like to think that if we do everything right, that everything will be OK.   Its what we like to believe/need to believe but it isnt absolutely true.    

Thanks yarpos, wing loading was low, I was using a 260 student rig and my weight was about 83kg. The reserve was same or similar size I think.

From your last statement, I understand there is inherent risk in this sport even if we follow protocol, a randomness and complexity to nature that can never be fully accounted for even if we follow good procedure and protocol. At the same time when an incident like this is examined there are always areas where one thinks it could have been done differently. An example is that I read today that sometimes pulling on the reserve handle can sometimes be faster than the RSL and increase the chance of a reserve main interaction. Is that true?, what is the average time of the automatic reserve deployment from a cutaway and RSL. RSL's are manditory here for less experienced skydivers but this is one time I wish I did not have one and had  waiedt for stability before pulling my reserve handle. I also understand far too many skydivers in the past have died with there reserves still in their rig.

10 hours ago, Bluejules8000 said:

RSL's are manditory here for less experienced skydivers but this is one time I wish I did not have one and had  waiedt for stability before pulling my reserve handle.

Sorry to hear about your accident.

Based on your account of the events I think there is a good chance that the RSL didn't activate your reserve, and played no role in the reserve malfunction. 

You could look at the reserve cable, they often get a kink in them when there is a RSL initiated reserve deployment.

But like you say in the quote before, you pulled the reserve handle, or at least that is what I interpret your comment "reserve deployment" to mean in that sequence.

On 6/10/2022 at 7:59 PM, Bluejules8000 said:

Remained this way for at least six seconds including a right head turn. Nothing felt so went to emergency procedures, cutaway, and reserve deployment.

This sounds like a pilot chute in tow, or potentially a pilot chute that is stuck in the low pressure burble above you or even sucked right on to your container. Pchapman's has a good potential account above for the PCIT scenario.

You did the right thing to initiate emergency procedures.

What happens next is a bit of luck. Once the reserve is deploying the main container may stay closed if there is a misrouted or pierced bridle, or it may open up and the main may start deploying because having the reserve tray open and the reserve out relieves some pressure and tension on the main container which allows the closing pin to finally clear the closing loop.

There may be things that you could have done differently, or it could have just been a spot of bad luck. You may never be able to determine exactly what happened here but you can talk with your instructors and experienced skydivers to help avoid it in the future.

• Know your gear, ensure that is is properly maintained, properly configured, and operate it correctly.
• Practice your emergency procedures. Review how you will respond to different circumstances.
• Plan your jumps from take off all the way till you are back safely in the packing area.
• Build awareness about what other skydivers are doing.

You may also want to talk about your accident with a therapist who specializes in traumatic accidents and events. Having an accident, especially one that has many questions, can leave you with a lot of mental stuff to process.

An RSL will always pull a reserve ripcord faster than a human.

Back around 1990, AFF I/E Rick Horn made a training film for the US Air Force. The training film included a couple dozen intentional cutaways both with and without RSLs. Despite all his recent experience, Rick was never able to pull his reserve ripcord before his RSL did.

The only way a human can beat an RSL is if the main does not release ... or is still inside the container as Wendy suggested.

IOW an RXL will not pull your reserve ripcord during all types of malfunctions.

All that being said, it is still a good habit to pull your release cables completely clear of your harness and promptly follow through with your reserve ripcord.

excellent info regarding tension knots

read it

https://docs.google.com/document/d/13FS-69F2ExGxwBw_nes_M1B5A9ENia8k-RQxgknw32U/edit

think

form your own conclusions.

I'm going to have some 6 grommet sliders made.

Nice work not dying!

Thank you for the replies, and apologies for my tardiness.

wmw999

 I still have strong memories of pulling the cutaway first. I can see why some training advises cutting away with both hands and then pulling reserve handle with both hands. I was taught to look and locate both and then cut away with right hand followed by pulling the reserve handle with the left. I remember after locating both I paused for at least a couple of seconds as I was concerned that I may have moved to emergency procedures too quickly as time gets distorted when in an emergency situation. I also remember thinking I hope the cutaway Velcro comes away easily and it did.

 DougH

I think the main parachute was still in the container, I remained in belly to earth freefall during the emergency procedures and if the main parachute is not out I now assume the RSL won’t do its job. I never got a chance to look at the gear, so I don’t know what the reserve cable was like. The kink in the cable sounds a reliable positive indicator of a RSL-initiated reserve deployment but can have false negatives. I think it was a pilot chute in tow and realize there are multiple possible reasons, such the chute being stuck in my burble…..sometimes I think I may have “Lazy Throw” put on my tombstone, as a summary of my lifeJ.

I have also been advised that a too-tight closing loupe could have made the pin difficult to extract, or the bridle may have wrapped around the pilot chute and prevented it from inflating. I am pretty sure the pilot chute was cocked, as it is checked about four times before the jump. The packer, myself, a jumper on the ground and a more experienced skydiver in the plane. I wish I had waited longer before going to emergency procedures as I deployed at 5000-5500 feet so had plenty of time to ‘relax’ before moving to emergency procedures. Being spun on my back, seeing lines unravel from my foot and seeing a fouled reserve open above my head were almost simultaneous, so there is a good likelihood they did come out together. I did talk to a club coach, but he only talked about the poor throw and burble, which I thought was a little unfair. As the gear was hired and packed, I feel that there can be a lack of openness about the many possibilities due to legal considerations, although laying blame is not my intention. The safety officer for the Australian Parachute Association was more forthcoming with possibilities.

Regarding the trauma, I started back work a few weeks ago, and although I will be left with residual issues, the experience has been amazing. Seeing possible death, a short period of experiencing pain that makes death nothing to fear and a blessing, the humility of needing your arse wiped and the pleasure of short-term gains in recovery. Finally, the relationships with hospital staff and patients were inspiring, of the latter, some were facing hardships much worse than mine, and they weren’t indulging in risky sports.

Riggerrob

Thanks, I now know the RSL is very fast and beats the handles if they are pulled in the correct order. I also think the main was still in the container, so the reserve handle activation was necessary.

 kleggo

That article was fascinating. I think I did sink to the level of my training as I had no idea what to do with my malfunction. Once I had tried to flare a few times, I did not think to use riser inputs to try and correct the spin. The safety officer who saw a video of the descent advised me I would have probably stalled the canopy, so maybe ignorance was bliss. As Pchapman had intimated earlier, an interaction between the main and reserve may have occurred. Reading the tension knot article, it seems that this may have caused asymmetric canopy expansion/inflation and line disorganization. A theory of twisted break lines as a culprit appears to not be substantiated by the research.

RolandForbes J I could have easily died, but there is much worse than death. I don’t think my marriage would have survived paraplegia, and although I give full credit to those who can, I don’t think I would have hung around with quadriplegia. Interestingly, the suicide rates for quadriplegia plummet compared to paraplegia, there are obvious reasons why. I had a few cracks in the cervical vertebrae and have 2 numb fingertips to remind me how bad it could have been.

I appreciate all the responses and just want to lastly talk about what I did do under canopy and get opinions if you are not sick of me by now.  My spiralling descent rate was fast, and my novice mind only thought to pull down with weight on the back risers to try and reduce the descent rate. I think it worked, but put me in a flatter spin, so I hit the ground side on. There were no compression injuries; the minor neck damage was an extension injury. I was hoping for an opinion on this and whether I made any difference. A very experienced skydiver named Boags was under canopy and filmed my descent. He landed off the dropzone and got to me within 23 seconds of hitting the ground. I have enclosed his video for any opinions.

It does look from the video that there was nothing caught up in the reserve, that it was a tension knot all on its own.  A rather unlucky day!

(That's both from the start of the video - with you way off in the distance - and near the end where the camera flyer swoops past you on the ground.)

Tension knots are made more likely (but still very rare) from a bad body position, or even a momentary entanglement with your foot. (As you said initially, after your massive crash you couldn't recall if it had been the main or reserve that was entangled for a moment around your foot.) Parachutes do better when opening symmetrically, and somewhat less so if one side (eg, jumper's shoulder) starts out way lower than the other.

And thus it seems not be have been as I had speculated -- before the photo from the video or the video came out -- that the description sounded like a typical main-reserve entanglement of some sort. Still, it is not impossible that there was some brief interaction / entanglement that hindered the reserve opening, where a very slow extraction from the bag, or interference from a main riser catching lines or whatever, could also have hindered the reserve inflation.

In any case, parachutes do open better when they start with a shoulders level body position, everything symmetrical, with no tumbling of the deployment bag, and the deployment proceeds at a normal rapid pace, so that it is less likely for slack lines to be whipping around that are more likely to cause a tension knot.

If you had time to pull down on rear risers - to reduce descent rate - you also had enough time to do a rear riser stall. If you quickly release the rear riser stall, half the tension knots will fall out. I have used this technique to clear dozens of tension knots on tandems. 

If the student is heavy enough to stiffen risers into iron crow bars, I use toggles to pull the canopy into a deep stall, then let my hands up quickly. The canopy dives forward, lines go slack and most of the tension knots drop out.

Please note that this technique does not work well on tiny canopies loaded more than 1:1 as the dive may be asymmetrical and throw you into line twists. The only way out of - tiny canopy - line twists is to cutaway. Whereas lightly-loaded student canopies just fly off on their merry way.

1 hour ago, riggerrob said:

Please note that this technique does not work well on tiny canopies loaded more than 1:1 as the dive may be asymmetrical and throw you into line twists.

One more reason why bigger is always better for reserve canopies.